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The Fifth Republic at Fifty: The Changing Face of French Politics and Political 
Economy.  
 
At its inception, a time of great political upheaval in France, it was uncertain whether 
the new regime would last five years, let alone fifty. The longevity of the regime is 
due in part to its flexibility and adaptability, which is a theme explored both below 
and in all of the contributions to this special issue. To set the scene, this will briefly 
elucidate some of the elements of the constitutional settlement of 1958 which have 
had an important bearing on its subsequent evolution. The rich and varied texture of 
French Republicanism makes it in one commentator’s eyes at once ‘the least precise 
and most evoked concept in the French political lexicon’ (Hayward 2007: 343). The 
Fifth Republic’s institutions and practices bore the imprint of a diverse amalgam of 
constitutional norms and political practices, each relating to the French Republican 
tradition; Rousseauian notions of general will, plebiscitary Bonapartism, 
parliamentarism, Jacobinism, dirigisme and Republican notions of universalism and 
egalitarianism.  This special issue explores some of the interesting patterns and 
dynamics of change and continuity in relation to each of these aspects of the French 
Republic tradition over the last 50 years. As is fitting on such an anniversary, each 
contribution will offer a brief historical overview of the issue area and to look at the 
similarities and differences between the contemporary period and 50 years ago.  
 
The first section of this introduction sets out some of the important elements of the 
Fifth Republic constitutional settlement. French democratic and Republican traditions 
were inscribed into the text of the constitution, and also its subsequent interpretation. 
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In the text, the interplay between general ‘versus’ particular will was transposed into 
the executive ‘versus’ the legislature. In its interpretation, these aspects are overlain 
with the additional elements of the interplay of parliamentarism, presidentialism and 
Bonapartism. The second section relates this constitutional context, and these 
complex and competing dynamics to the French party system and its evolution.  
 
This volume takes a political economy approach to the analysis of the Fifth Republic 
at fifty, situating the evolution of political institutions in the context of French 
state/market relations shaped by the Colbertist tradition. This found expression in 
post-war France in dirigisme – or directive state interventionism in the economy. In 
order to fully understand how and why the Fifth Republic has followed its particular 
path of development, it is necessary to understand how French welfare capitalism has 
evolved over the last 50 years. The third section thus discusses the dynamics of 
evolution of economic and social policy-making since 1958. 
 
Dirigisme’s centralising pathologies align it with another important French political 
tradition – Jacobinism. The fourth section explores how these economic and social 
transformations entailed a geographical reorganisation of French capitalism with 
profound political implications for French centre/periphery relations, and the 
powerful, centralising Jacobin tradition.  Having explored challenges to Jacobin 
universalism in relation to territory, the final section offers a gendered critique of the 
Fifth Republic. Shaped by a French Republican built on masculine norms, the 1958 
constitution’s institutionalisation of universalism and egalitarianism has led to 
decidedly gender-unequal political practices. Evolving notions of (gender) equality, 
and attempts to translate these evolving notions into institutions and policies are the 
final area of significant change over the last 50 years considered in this volume.  
 
The 1958 Constitutional Settlement 
 
The need to overcome the immobilisme which characterised the Fourth Republic’s 
discredited régime des partis was at the heart of the 1958 constitutional project. 
Government, it was argued, had to be afforded supremacy over Parliament, and this 
supremacy was codified in the new constitution. The 1958 constitutional text sets out 
unambiguously the supremacy of the executive over parliament (Elgie 1996a, 57-59), 
 3 
with government empowered through a series of ‘structural assets’ institutionalising 
its dominance over parliament, and a set of ‘constitutional weapons’ to be wielded by 
government in response to particular circumstances (Keeler 1993 : 521). 
 
Sartori identifies the French Fifth Republic as an ideal-typical example of a ‘Semi-
presidential’ regime, a ‘bicephalous system whose heads are unequal but also in 
oscillation between themselves’ – ‘the ‘first head’ is by custom (the conventions of 
the constitutions [‘living’ and written] the president, by law (the written text of the 
constitution) the prime minister, and the oscillations reflect the respective majority 
status of one over the other.’(1997, 123) For Elgie, at the core of the French Fifth 
Republic there is a ‘finely balanced constitutional dyarchy’ (Elgie 1999, 77) where ‘a 
popularly-elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister responsible 
to parliament.’(2001)  
 
The new constitution was intended by its author Michel Debré, to be a blueprint for 
British-style Prime Ministerial government (Debré 1981). However, whilst appearing 
to place the Prime Minister at the centre of the executive process, the French head of 
State has often been able to exploit presidential structural assets and constitutional 
weapons (Keeler 1993), in concert with the constitution’s ambiguity, to dominate the 
political system. The Algerian crisis, without which there would likely have been no 
constitutional and political upheaval in 1958, left its imprint on the structure and 
functioning of the new regime creating a presidential reserved domain in foreign 
policy, and preservation of the integrity of the French nation (see Howorth 1993). De 
Gaulle moved quickly to ensure his predominance in these and other policy areas. The 
ambiguity inherent in the 1958 constitution as to where power lay within the French 
‘dual executive’, successfully exploited by de Gaulle, established presidential 
precedents which overstepped the constitutional brief. This was achieved to a degree 
explicitly counter to the professed intentions of the drafters (see Debré 1981). The 
best example of exploiting constitutional ambiguity is article 5, establishing the 
President’s role as ‘arbitrator,’ which ‘encourages the perception that the president is 
above the political process but at the same time it can also legitimise almost any 
intervention that the President might wish to make.’(Elgie 1999, 76) The Fifth 
Republic underwent rapid and far-reaching Presidentialisation between 1958 and 
1962, culminating in the first direct election of the President in 1965. 
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Thus, a purely textual analysis of the new constitution fails to capture the crucial 
distinction between constitutional theory and Presidential practice. If the new 
constitution codified the shift from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ government, it was President 
De Gaulle (and not Prime Minister Debré) who personified that shift. Ironically, de 
Gaulle’s most significant extra-constitutional act was to sack Debré in April 1962. 
Debré’s replacement Pompidou ‘accepted without demur the presidential intervention 
which Debré had resented as a deviation from the letter of the constitution.’ (Hayward 
1993a, 23-5) Hayward has explored two distinct and conflicting interpretations of 
arbiter, “first, an arbitrator of disputes or referee who remains politically neutral and 
impartial, and secondly an arbiter, whose direct involvement in taking controversial 
political decisions meant that he would have to be politically accountable.” (1993b, 46 
& 48). The finesse achieved by de Gaulle, the self-styled ‘arbitrator above political 
circumstances,’1 was to secure the powers associated with the expansive interpretation 
of that term, and the degree of accountability associated with the minimalist 
interpretation. The Gaullian reinterpretation of Article 5, explicit in de Gaulle’s 
Bayeux speech of 1946, and his famous press conference of 1964, transforms the 
President, in Massot’s phrase, from referee into team captain.(1987; Cogan 1996, 
183-6 & 210) 
 
Precedents set by de Gaulle meant Debré’s Prime Ministerial government aspirations 
remained adrift in the seas of pious wishes for nearly 30 years. Yet the president’s 
pre-eminence was not structurally determined, but contingent on circumstances. It 
rested on prevailing political conditions, and interpretative leeway. Duverger’s 
majority power thesis argues that the structural aspects of presidential power are not 
the key determining factors. This approach urges us to be alive to the contingency 
involved in the ebb and flow of Fifth Republic presidential power relationships. They 
vary according to personalities and more importantly to political context, far and 
away the most significant aspect of this being the nature of the parliamentary majority 
within the Assemblée Nationale. This parliamentary majority, and the nature of the 
president’s relations with it, was termed by Duverger in 1978 ‘the keystone’ of the 
regime (1978, 90). 
                                                 
1
 A phrase from de Gaulle’s infamous 1946 Bayeux speech, quoted in Cogan (1996, 187) 
 5 
 
Thus the evolution of the regime over the last 50 years has not seen the inexorable 
expansion of presidential dominance. Rather, it has demonstrated the shifting sands 
on which presidential power is founded. As Duverger prosaically put it, “the French 
republican monarch might be seen as a Protean King, changing shape and power 
according to the nature of parliamentary forces” (1974, 188). The nature of the 
parliamentary majority (single party, balanced or imbalanced coalition, supporting or 
in conflict with the president) and nature of relations with the presidential party in 
parliament explains the varying nature and degree of presidential power in the 1970s 
and 1980s. A string of cohabitations after 1986 saw Debré’s aspirations of Prime 
Ministerial government partially realised, with the President reduced to a more 
ceremonial role. Chirac’s victory in 1995 followed by his ill-advised dissolution 
which ushered in the 5-year cohabitation after 1997, saw French presidential power 
resources sink to a new low. Indeed, Bell claimed ‘Chirac showed that France could 
survive without an Executive president’ (2000, 240). Thus it is not presidential 
dominance, but rather the constitutional interpretive flexibility and the contingency of 
Fifth Republic power relations which are the key continuities from 1958 to 2008. 
 
The shift to a 5 year term, aligned with the parliamentary term in 2000, and the 
inversion of electoral calendars ensuring parliamentary elections would follow on the 
coattails of the presidential election, seemed to suggest a re-presidentialisation of the 
regime at the dawn of the 21
st
 Century. The extra-ordinary events of 2002 muddied 
the waters somewhat, but in 2007 all the elements were in place. A dominant, 
confident, homme providentiel of a presidential candidate, with a thoroughly 
presidentialised and relatively united party behind him, won a resounding presidential 
victory followed by a sizeable parliamentary majority. After all Sarkozy’s big talk of 
a radical change in France’s politics, and political economy, which had peppered his 
campaign, the constitutional scene looked set for words to be translated into deeds.  
 
Yet even with all the aces up his sleeve, Sarkozy has, one year on, not been able to 
deliver the kind of transformation he promised. There have been, as Levy charts in 
this volume, some achievements on pension reform, and labour market reform of lay-
off procedures and simplified work contracts. However the new president frittered 
away political capital through hyper-activity and vocal interventionism in 
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innumerable policy fields. His highly mediatised personal life and erratic behaviour 
has conveyed none of the gravitas expected of a French head of state. His opinion poll 
ratings plummeted accordingly. Meanwhile, he has invested much in ill-judged 
initiatives like the Mediterranean Union. Most importantly, however, Sarkozy has 
systematically neglected to nurture and sustain good relations with the UMP, and the 
parliamentary forces which are his crucial power base. Sarkozy’s government of all 
the talents inevitably overlooked many a party loyalist’s hopes of higher office, and 
put many noses out of joint within the UMP. The new president’s often dismissive 
treatment of ‘his’ party (and members of his government including the Prime 
Minister), combined with his plunging popularity, meant that the first year of the 
Sarkozy’s presidency demonstrates the protean nature of political power under the 
Fifth Republic identified by Duverger. Scarcely a year after his supposedly regime-
changing sweep to power, his mismanagement and poor judgement have taken the 
wind out of the sails of what threatened to be a re-presidentialised Fifth Republic. 
Naysayers and decline theorists (Bavarez 2003; Smith 2004) have, it seems, further 
grounds for their dark mutterings about France’s ungovernability. 
 
Personal Power and the ‘Partified’ Regime: De Gaulle and ‘Popular monarchy’ 
 
Michel Debré interpreted de Gaulle’s role as a ‘Republican monarch’ representing the 
French people as a whole. De Gaulle, too, referred to ‘his’ regime as a ‘popular 
monarchy’ (Hayward 1993a, 22) and ‘regarded himself as the mediator between the 
people and France, a task for which [de Gaulle felt] parliamentary party leaders were 
unfit.’(Hayward 1993a, 14). There was a very personal dimension of his power, 
rooted in his war legacy. This personal relationship with the French citizenry 
illustrated his ‘Bonapartist’ interpretation of popular support. This must be understood 
in the context of a Rousseauian branch of French Republican discourse which 
distrusts intermediaries (parties), preferring a direct engagement with the citizenry to 
discern the (general) will of the people. Bonapartism is characterised by Hoffman as 
‘the confiscation of power by a charismatic figure through plebiscites that both paid 
homage to and manipulated the principle of popular sovereignty.’(Hoffman 1991, 44) 
De Gaulle’s view was less critical, and he cherished and vaunted his direct link to the 
citizenry. This explains his penchant for referenda which he regarded as plebiscites on 
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his own presidency,
2
 and the 1962 reform (discussed below),
3
 and indeed his 
campaign in the 1965 presidential election. Although by no means a dominant strand 
of Republicanism (discredited by Louis Bonaparte’s totalitarian usurping of power 
after the previous direct election in the 18
th
 Brumaire), Bonapartism was nevertheless 
a resource upon which de Gaulle drew with consummate skill. De Gaulle clearly saw 
himself as ‘spokesperson for and the incarnation of the general will’ (Elgie 1996b 67-
8). 
 
Although all his successors as French president attempted to emulate the personal and 
direct link to the French people, this dimension of presidential power was partially 
undermined as the semi-presidential Fifth Republic regime became progressively 
‘partified’. This at first glance seems wholly counter to the General’s vision, given de 
Gaulle’s public disdain for political parties, and his assiduous construction of his 
political legitimacy without any reference to party. Yet paradoxically, for all his 
disdain for parties, de Gaulle was reliant upon his Union pour la Nouvelle République 
(UNR) power base for support, and without a presidential majority in the Assemblée 
– orchestrated and structured by the UNR, his position would have been greatly 
weakened. Indeed, the public image of aloofness from party was almost certainly an 
exaggeration of reality, since no successful politician can ignore their power base. De 
Gaulle is perhaps best described as a ‘surreptitiously partisan statesman’ (Hayward 
1993b). 
 
The France of the Fifth Republic, just as that of the Fourth and Third, remained in 
important ways a parliamentary democracy structured by party politics. The party-
based democratic traditions built up during the previous two republics were not 
overthrown overnight, even if party now co-existed with other powerful 
countervailing political forces both personal, in the form of de Gaulle, and 
institutional in the form of the semi-presidential regime. Thus the legacy for de 
Gaulle’s successors as leaders of both government and opposition in France was 
complex – an empowered presidency (with attendant personalised power dimensions) 
                                                 
2
 These also hinged on the political cleavage within the electorate between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
Republics in France which the Cartel des non had failed to mobilise effectively in opposition to the key 
1962 referendum on direct presidential election. 
3
 The more direct reason for his enthusiasm for referenda in the 1958-1962 period was as a means of 
by-passing a hostile legislature. 
 8 
grafted on to what was still a parliamentary regime where parties remained crucial to 
both presidential election campaigns, and the exercise of presidential power.  
 
The Fifth Republic and Presidentialised Party System 
 
As the dust settled after the regime-changing events of 1958, de Gaulle needed to 
institutionalise his personal power, and legitimise it in a manner which his indirectly 
elected head of state status under the 1958 constitution did not. In November 1962, he 
proposed (unconstitutionally) a referendum on constitutional change to make the 
President directly elected by universal suffrage, thus giving the President an enhanced 
national mandate and a degree of legitimacy to challenge the National Assembly. 
This, as Grunberg explores in his contribution to this volume, was to have a profound 
impact on the nature of the French party system. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
many party leaders at the time believed Fifth Republic to be a flash in the pan Gaullist 
interregnum, soon to be superseded by a reversion to parliamentary coalitional 
government (Wilson 1988: 508). The Cartel des Non exercise of 1962, the protest of 
all parties bar the Gaullists (and Giscard’s Républicains Indépendents) in favour of a 
parliamentary regime against de Gaulle’s move to install direct presidential elections, 
was a clash between the new and old republics. Its approach entailed the Fourth 
Republic’s ‘third force’ logic - of parliamentary coalition forming between centrist 
and left parties. The outcome was straw in the wind of growing presidentialisation of 
the new Republic. 
 
The 1962 parliamentary elections were a ‘watershed event’ in the Fifth Republic and 
the French party system. (Ysmal 1998, 14) De Gaulle’s dissolution of the hostile 
Assembly, and asking the electorate for both a yes vote in the referendum and a vote 
for a parliamentary candidate who would form part of a ‘presidential majority’ was a 
masterstroke. The rout of the cartel des non installed the UNR as dominant party ‘at 
the service’ of de Gaulle’s ‘plebiscitary monocracy’. (Duhamel & Grunberg 2001, 
533) precipitated a revolution in the French parliamentary and party systems. The 
referendum was, a ‘battering ram’ (Goldey, quoted in Avril 1995, 56) to break the 
party system of the Fourth Republic. The French Party system underwent a thorough 
‘presidentialisation’ in the decade following the 1962 referendum. Its impact was felt 
on party structures, the logic and direction of party competition, on the relationship 
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between president and parliamentary groups, and even the source of democratic 
legitimacy under the Fifth Republic. 
 
The linking of presidential and parliamentary majorities was crucial to the evolution 
of the Fifth Republic party system, and a corollary of the re-interpretation of the 
relationship between the two heads of the French executive discussed above. The 
presidential majority cast the mould for future relations between President and Prime 
Minister. From 1962 until cohabitation in 1986, the construction of a majority in the 
second round of the presidential election, and the linking of those presidential electors 
with a majority in the Assemblée Nationale, the result of a construction of a coalition 
of support for the President became the name of the game (Avril 1988). This saw the 
birth of a French constitutional convention which Charlot describes as ‘the principle 
of presidential initiative’ (1983: 28) which subordinates the party to president in 
policy formation, policy selection, and electoral campaigning. The President’s 
electoral campaign platform became the blueprint for the subsequent government 
programme. This ensured a thorough presidentialisation of the French party system, 
and an end to the discredited regime des partis of the fourth republic, a point De 
Gaulle himself reiterated in his 1965 Presidential election campaign in presenting 
himself as ‘a head of state not beholden to a party’ (Avril, 1995, 48). 
 
It is difficult to over-state the centrality of presidentialisation to party system change 
under the Fifth Republic. As Gaffney puts it, ‘as an organising principle of French 
political life the presidential elections are of crucial significance’. The presidency 
represents both ‘the ultimate prize sought by France’s major politicians’ and an 
‘organising principle … not only of political life generally, but of the parties 
themselves.’ (Gaffney 1988, 3, 4 & 7) In similar vein, Parodi does not exaggerate in 
stating that presidentialism structures political time and space under the French Fifth 
Republic. (Parodi 1997, 294-5) French Presidential elections structure French 
‘political time’ by remaining the key defining ‘moment’ in French politics (every 7 
years from 1958, then every 5 years from 2002). This provides the key time horizon 
for political strategy in France, it is against that cycle that strategies for all other 
elections must be interpreted. Presidentialism also structures the space of party 
competition in Fifth Republic France. Parodi identifies changing institutional logics of 
the Fifth Republic, specifically a ‘multiplication of binary constraints’ which include 
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not just the presidential and legislative second rounds, but also rules governing the 
motion of censure. (1997, 293) The two-way presidential run-off as the key political 
site of competition within the Fifth Republic, acting in concert with the use of the 
single-member majoritarian dual-ballot legislative electoral system, and finally the 
responsibility of Government before an (admittedly much weakened) parliament were 
conducive to a reconstitution of the party system along presidentialised and bipolar 
lines.  
 
The scrutin uninominale à deux tours, presidential and legislative electoral system 
was specifically designed to preclude the perceived systemic weaknesses of the fourth 
Republic. The threshold for access to the second ballot,
4
 whilst by no means 
precluding multi-partyism, did favour the formation of majorities by larger parties. 
The significant change was not the number of parties in the system, but the nature of 
party competition. Whilst the new electoral arrangements permitted the mutation from 
what Sartori called ‘polarised pluralism’ to bi-polar pluralism,5 they did not determine 
the change. The Third Republic, which had used a similar electoral system between 
1871 and 1940, had not had a bipolar party system.(Hoffman 1991, 46) To adequately 
explain the change, we must also consider the unambiguous centrality of the 
presidential election to politics under de Gaulle’s Republic, and the impact on the 
party system of Gaullism.  
 
The strategy of key actors (notably de Gaulle, Pompidou and Mitterrand) shaped 
France’s new bipolar political landscape in the decade after the 1962 presidential 
election referendum. The contours and features of this new landscape remained 
recognisable throughout the subsequent evolutions of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle 
sought a much reduced role for parties, to be (he hoped) eclipsed by the Presidency. 
However, his successors recognised the constraints and opportunities presented by the 
new Republics’ competing institutional logics (Elgie 1996b). Pompidou (between 
1962 and 1969) and Mitterrand (between 1971 and 1974) actively  orchestrated a 
reconstruction of the core of the French party system – along presidentialised bipolar 
                                                 
4
 Set at 5% of those voting in 1958, revised to 10% of the registered electorate in 1966, which was in 
turn raised to 12.5% of the registered electorate in 1976. Given increasing levels of abstention , this use 
of proportion of the registered electorate becomes and ever higher bar to overcome.  
5
 In 1958, only 20% of second round contests were straight fights. By 1981 that proportion was 96.6%. 
(Bell & Criddle 1988 : 23) 
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lines. Pompidou sought to consolidate the presidential majority in parliament by 
establishing stable alliances between the Gaullist party and other parties and traditions 
of the French mainstream Right. His aim was to gradually replace the pro- & anti- the 
new republic cleavage (which had characterised the cartel des non of 1962) with a 
Left/Right ideological cleavage which is deeply embedded in French political 
traditions. As Avril notes, the centre had been transformed from the centre of power 
within the political system, into an asset which ‘mainstream’ (and not anti-system) 
left and right bid for in a bipolar competition oriented towards the alternance of 
majorities (1995, 47). 
 
Mitterrand, for his part, sought to construct a presidential majority which could lay 
claim to a parliamentary majority, which required the major parties of the Left to 
embrace presidentialism. These two engaged in ‘at once a presidentialisation of 
parties, and a ‘partisanisation’ of the regime, seeking an accommodation between the 
parliamentary majority and the presidential majority, the first implying seeking stable 
partisan governmental alliances, and the latter the ‘appropriation’ of the presidential 
election by the major parties.’(Duhamel & Grunberg 2001, 534) 
 
Just as the nature and degree of presidential power has evolved over fifty years, so too 
has the precise configuration of the party system. After twenty years, 1978’s quadrille 
bipolaire indicated a balance of political forces. In recent years, the prospect of 
bipolar presidentialised France developing two party politics has been mooted as a 
possible evolution (Grunberg & Haegel, 2007). This is in part (Grunberg argues 
below) as a result of the shift to a five year term and the inversion of the electoral 
calendar. Yet the emergent two-party political scene in contemporary France is 
distinctly unbalanced. Gone is the unstable equilibrium between left and right which 
facilitated the regular swing of the political pendulum from left to right between 1978 
and 2002. Fragmentation and decline across the spectrum of the French left leave the 
Socialists with little prospect of constructing a governing majority out of beleaguered, 
marginalised allies. Meanwhile, the Socialists themselves last won the presidency 20 
years ago, with the only successful presidential candidate they have ever found in 50 
years. Thus the balance between partisan forces in 2008 resembles to a degree those 
of 1958, with a pre-eminent, perhaps unassailable mainstream Right (and the Left 
awaiting the next Mitterrand?). 
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The Fifth Republic and Political Economy  
 
This special issue situates the changing political institutions and traditions of Fifth 
Republic France in relation to France’s evolving political economy. The contributions 
by Levy, Palier, Le Galès and Murray each chart the changing state/society relations, 
public policy packages, and political economic conditions since. This is because 
analysing how successive French governments have sought to deliver policies to 
realise Republican and/or Jacobin notions of dirigisme, universalism and 
egalitarianism over the last 50 years is revealing of very significant shifts in France’s 
political economy. Appreciating these transformations is essential to a full 
appreciation of ‘the Fifth Republic at Fifty’.  
 
Thus the Fiftieth anniversary of the Fifth Republic invites a retrospective which 
brings to light shifts in French state/market relations.  That said, the onset of the Fifth 
Republic itself was not as significant a break in state/market relations or economic 
policy as in other aspects of French politics and institutions. The institutions of 
indicative economic planning, established by Monnet and others in the wake of 
liberation, had been functioning relatively effectively in the 1950s, and continued to 
do so into the 1960s. Both the dirigiste policy apparatus and the French welfare state, 
established under the predecessor regime, continued to shaped French political and 
social conditions, while the same elites in planning ministries were still pulling the 
levers of economic policy-making.  
 
Traditions of state direction of, and intervention in, economic activity in France have 
a long heritage, traceable at least as far back as Jean-Baptiste Colbert, minister under 
Louis XIV between 1661 and 1683. Dirigisme is rooted in state traditions and policy 
practices of directive interventionism in the economy. After the revolution, such 
interventionism became harnessed to Jacobinism and Republican ideals, integral to 
the development of France’s ‘one and indivisible Republic’. The post-war dirigiste 
mode of state–economy relations was ably captured by Shonfield (1969). He 
identified, at the core of the French model, state-led, active economic and industrial 
interventionism, with the dirigiste state using its key agencies to steer the nation’s 
economic development (Shonfield 1969: ch. 5, see also Levy’s contribution to this 
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volume). This was predicated upon a set of coordinating and steering mechanisms 
including price, credit and exchange controls. Norms of tutelle (or hands-on 
supervision) by state actors over key (public and private) industries provided the 
necessary direction. These involved ‘an intricate network of commitments on the part 
of private firms... all in return for favours from the state... [and] the habit of the 
exercise of power by public officials over the private sector of the economy’ 
(Shonfield 1969: 86 and 128). The final element was state orchestration of industrial 
finance through the plan.  
 
Whilst 1958-59 could not be described as ‘business as normal’, nevertheless the 
technocratic, elitist approach to planning gave French dirigiste economic governance 
a degree of insulation from the political turmoil and seismic constitutional events of 
1958. Later, from the late 1970s onwards, the reverse became true. Charting the 
evolution of French dirigisme highlights how the political economy within which 
Fifth Republic institutions are embedded has undergone a profound transformation, 
whilst the political institutions and constitutional regime have enjoyed a degree of 
stability. Palier, Levy and Le Galès explore the episodic but at times seismic changes 
in the French political economy which have unfolded under the Fifth Republic, and in 
particular over the last 25 years. Much of this transformation was driven through by 
the political leaders and the stable parliamentary majorities those Fifth Republic 
institutions delivered. By the end of the 1990s, as both Levy and Le Galès note, the 
purchase which directive state intervention had over a wide range of economic, social 
and territorial policy areas had diminished substantially compared to 1958. One of the 
more important evolutions under Fifth Republic France is that the long-established 
French state traditions of dirigisme are in retreat. 
 
In the 1970s, dysfunctionalities of dirigisme (see Levy) acted in concert with an 
economic conjuncture to herald the end of the trente glorieuses of strong and steady 
French economic growth. This, along with wider global and European changes in 
political economy and ideology, caused a paradigm shift toward neo-liberal economic 
management in the 1980s. Privatisation, budgetary austerity, German-style sound 
anti-inflationary economic management became the watchwords of French economic 
rectitude. This new approach generated higher unemployment with significant social 
costs, and Levy charts how the French ‘social anaesthesia’ state re-organised social 
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policy in an attempt to manage these. Yet this new logic of social policy proved very 
costly, and thus difficult to reconcile to the new economic orthodoxy. Levy and Palier 
both analyse the changing logics underpinning both the French welfare state and 
economic intervention under the latter day Fifth Republic. From a ‘Keynesianism’ 
tool of macro-economic management (wherein Palier identifies an alignment of social 
and economic policy rationales), the French welfare state became seen as cause of a 
fiscal crisis of the state, burden on employers and perceived impediment to economic 
competitiveness. Attempts to increase governmental influence over the French 
welfare state were partly because of the increasing costs. 
 
The picture of retreat from dirigisme is an uneven one. Contrary to statist and dirigiste 
tendencies within the wider French political economy, the French state was not in 
control of the formation or indeed management of welfare provision for much of the 
post-war era, as Palier points out. Here, the social partners were at the helm. In the 
contemporary period, Palier explores how the state became increasingly concerned 
with managing the financial costs of French welfare provision in the context of high 
long-term unemployment. Over the course of the Fifth Republic, and particularly 
from the 1970s onwards, dirigiste state managers sought to appropriate power over 
welfare reform, and excise social partners from decisions.  
 
Yet these dirigiste impulses struggle with the byzantine complexity of the institutions 
and programmes of French welfare provision, and the enduring role of the French 
social partners. The challenges facing welfare reformers became all the more clear 
with the 1995 mouvement sociale which increased the political salience and 
sensitivity of welfare retrenchment still further. Within contemporary welfare reform, 
there are some small signs of evolution towards an activation oriented refocusing of 
employment-centred social policy. Yet both Levy and Palier note that significant 
policy shifts in social policy and the French welfare state will only succeed of 
governing strategies take account of the complexities and the range of actors 
involved.  
 
The combination of retrenchment pressures, and the pathologies of a forbiddingly 
fragmented system whose coverage is generous in places but very patchy, mean that 
the Republican ideal of equality is poorly served by the institutions and programmes 
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of French welfare provision. The retrenchment phase of French welfare provision 
from the 1980s onwards has if anything exacerbated this problem, and seen a trend 
increase in inequality. The reach of French dirigiste welfare state reformers, it seems,  
exceeds their grasp, with welfare state reform and retrenchment proving an extremely 
difficult public policy goal to achieve. Welfare state reform which adheres to 
Republican principles of equality is a still more remote prospect. Reform has 
culminated, according to Palier, in a distinctly inegalitarian ‘dualisation’ of the system 
(separating those with sufficient contribution histories to benefit from generous social 
insurance from those on means tested residual benefits),  underpinned by a creeping 
‘logic of individualisation ands privatisation of social protection’.  
 
Jack Hayward has elsewhere exposed numerous hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and 
anachronisms within France’s Republican tradition and in particular its egalitarian 
dimension. For him, France’s ‘indivisible’ republic is but a ‘superimposition of a 
spurious unity on an empirical plurality’ (2007: 67), wherein ‘nominal equality is 
contradicted by a multitude of increasing inequalities’ (2007: 372). Both Palier and 
Levy find evidence to support this case, especially since the 1970s, with inegalitarian 
tendencies intensified within welfare state provision and social policy as the Fifth 
Republic has evolved.  
 
Centre Periphery Relations under the Fifth Republic – Jacobinism in check? 
 
The changing politics of centre periphery relations in France can only be adequately 
understood in the light of this changing French political economy.  The political 
economic transformations brought about by 30 years of glorious post-war growth, 
followed by a retreat from dirigisme and a fiscal crisis of the state increasing financial 
pressures on public policy have, Le Galès argues in this volume, altered the economic 
and political geography of France. Whilst successive revolutions, constitutional 
monarchies, empires and republics have left their mark on that political geography, 
one enduring and powerful centralising force within French political culture ever 
since 1789 has been Jacobinism. 
 
The 1958 settlement re-enforced such Jacobin centralising tendencies, and indeed 
Michel Debré was a personification of them. De Gaulle viewed local interests with a 
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similar suspicion to parties as impediments to (his) realisation of the general will. 
Thus with the onset of the Fifth Republic there was no major rupture in the territorial 
organisation of French political life and power relations to match the dramatic 
transformations of presidentialisation in the political regime and party system. The 
centralisers’ goal in the early Fifth Republic, as Le Galès charts, was a modernisation 
of French society and economy using familiar Jacobin, centralised means. Yet in 
empowering (centrally controlled) regional economic coordination in 1959, the 
Jacobins began (perhaps unwittingly) to unleash some decentralising tendencies. 
 
In the context of strong economic growth, a dirigiste elite acting in concert with large 
firms worked to transform local economies. Le Galès maps out the geographical and 
territorial re-organisations of French capitalism which accompanied the post-war 
economic modernisation (entailing a shift from small-scale economic activity to 
maturation of French Fordism). Paradoxically, this territorial reorganisation and 
modernisation of French capitalism, orchestrated by centralising Parisian dirigiste 
state and corporate managers, sowed the seeds of decentralisation. The transformation 
of French economic geography (orchestrated by the Jacobin French State in Paris) 
generated the impetus (felt first in the labour market, and later in democratic politics) 
for subsequent decentralisation. DATAR’s building up of cities such as Rennes, 
Nantes, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, Nice, Grenoble, Strasbourg in the 1960s 
created new centres of economic activity. In time, these became sources of political 
power, advancing demands for greater autonomy. A combination of the spirit 1968, 
and the aftershocks of the 1970s economic crisis being felt in these new regional 
economic centres of activity (or, increasingly, inactivity) ended the Jacobin elite-
driven geographical organisation of French capitalism.   
 
The Fifth Republic’s political institutions facilitated resistance (notably from the 
Senate) which staved off decentralising change, yet those institutions themselves were 
evolving, and their ability to resist was under threat. As Grunberg notes in this 
volume, in the 1960s and 1970s the French party system was changing.  
Presidentialisation and nationalisation of French party politics challenged the old 
conservative localism, and with the changing party system came a shift in the realms 
of the possible for decentralisation. Just as these cities and their economic geography 
were changing, a new Socialist politics of the local was emerging. The 1977 
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municipal elections thus had implications both the rise of the French Socialist Party, 
and the possibilities of political decentralisation under the Fifth Republic. The likes of 
Defferre and Mauroy were challenging centralised industrial restructuring. Here they 
found common cause with Rocard and the ‘Second Left’ proclaiming decentralised 
politics of ‘autogestion’ in opposition to centralising technocratic Gaullism (and the 
monolithic French State).  
 
The hesitant, anachronistic, decentralisation which followed in the 1980s did little to 
simplify the multi-levelled French polity. Rather than apportioning powers rationally, 
the reforms merely added new bodies to the existing patchwork of local bodies, 
causing further duplication and overlapping of competencies. The boundaries of local 
government were not rationalised, nor were the number of units reduced.
6
 This 
overlaying of new levels of governance without removing or rationalising any of the 
others, nor indeed clarifying hierarchical relations between them, was also a costly 
exercise. From modest beginnings, the budgets and resources of these new regional 
bodies grew incrementally. Aided by Europeanisation (which saw the empowering 
regions and cities), and the creation of inter-communal structures, gradually these new 
local political and regional structures gained resources and capabilities. A second 
wave of decentralisation, this time by the Right in 2004, further undermined 
Jacobinism, yet still there was no rationalisation of French multi-levelled governance.  
 
The decentralisation which followed from the 1980s onwards is arguably the biggest 
change in France’s constitutional arrangements over the lifetime of the Fifth Republic. 
It has certainly challenged and transformed French political culture and eroded the 
centrality of Jacobinism. That the partial decline of Jacobinism has accompanied the 
partial decline of dirigisme is no accident. Both are part of a change in the nature of 
the French state/society relations and politics. Decentralisation reduces the purchase 
of Parisian elites over the evolution of French capitalism. Meanwhile, the costs of 
four co-existing levels of sub-national governance, in the context of budgetary 
pressures and deteriorating public finances, reduces governmental room to 
manoeuvre. As a result, the French State’s dirigiste and Jacobin control of the French 
territory and economy is much reduced in 2008 compared with 1958. 
                                                 
6
 France still has in excess of 36, 000 communes, 26, 000 of which have a population of less than 700 
(Ashford 1990: 57) indeed, some communes have no population at all. 
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French Universalism and the Fifth Republic  
 
France’s ‘one and indivisible’ Republic, and Jacobin notions of universalism and 
egalitarianism are increasingly at odds with a differentiated territorial reality.  There is 
a similar gap between rhetoric and reality in relation to gender politics under the Fifth 
Republic.  The French Republican tradition combines commitments to universalism 
and egalitarianism, both of which were written into and therefore preserved by the 
1958 constitutional settlement which founded the Fifth Republic. However, in the last 
50 years, the politicisation of the gender dimensions of equality has exposed the sham 
of that universalism and egalitarianism, and brought into the political limelight the 
inequitable consequences of France’s ‘one and indivisible republic’. As Murray notes 
in this volume, French Republicanism has at its heart a ‘universalist tradition built on 
masculine norms’. The attendant refusal to acknowledge sexual difference has been a 
significant source of enduring gender inequality.  
 
Gender égalité was largely absent from the political agenda in 1958, so how it 
is understood and defended within French politics today represents a huge shift. Yet 
the fact that gender (in)equality has become politicised in recent decades has not yet 
transformed how French Republican egalitarianism finds expression in the political 
practices of the Fifth Republic. Murray identifies how the egalitarian and universalist 
cloak of French Republicanism masks enduring male dominance and structural gender 
bias within representative politics in France. Thus attempts to advance female 
representation through quotas fell foul of the Constitutional Council, protecting a 
‘gender-blind’ universalist notion of equality whose real world effects in French 
political life have been anything but equitable in gender terms. Murray demonstrates 
how ‘formal equality of citizens in the constitution’ reinforces ‘continuing inequality 
for women in practice’. 
 
Furthermore, beyond the realms of formal politics, increasing focus on the place of 
women within society, economy and the workplace has brought new understandings 
of what constitutes political, social and economic equality. Pre-existing patriarchal 
norms surrounding the gendered division of labour, and their institutionalisation 
within the French welfare state, meant that the citoyennes of Fifth Republic France 
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have been denied social and economic and political equality. The French welfare 
state, supposedly an institutional realisation of the Republican commitment to 
equality, is in fact built upon a male breadwinner model which has perpetuated and 
perhaps even exacerbated gender inequality under the Fifth Republic. 
 
Not until the Giscard Presidency, and then the election of the Socialists in 1981, did 
the patriarchal nature of the Fifth Republic constitutional settlement come under real 
pressure to reform. With the ‘parity movement’ in the 1990s, that pressure for reform 
began to bear fruit. Yet to circumvent the barrier of Republican universalism, the 
parity reform was forced to rely on some rather flimsy arguments about a natural 
divide between the two sexes which left many feminist campaigners feeling 
uncomfortable. Resistance to genuine gender egalitarianism has been strong, as the 
limited effectiveness of the parity law demonstrates. The male forces of conservatism, 
cloaked in the traditions and values of the Republic, are likely to succeed to protecting 
many of the highest echelons of French political power as male bastions for some 
time yet. This is an ongoing struggle within French political life. Advancements in 
women’s representation are halting, and often contingent upon the ‘fait du prince’ 
with male favour (ministerial office) being bestowed on selected women, whilst 
aggregate levels of female representation continue to flounder. 
 
For these and other reasons, French feminism’s relation with the French state remains 
uneasy. The patriarchal nature of the French state still leaves its footprints in areas 
such as childcare provision. Equal pay and employment rights, first legislated in the 
1970s and bolstered in the 1980s, have been slow to feed through into the real 
experiences of French women in the workplace. A partial gendering of French 
Republican universalism, as a result of the parity laws, is perhaps the most significant 
shift in recent times. However, without a profound challenge to dominant elements of 
the French fifth Republic to date such as presidentialism and a majoritarian electoral 
system, a genuinely gender-equal political regime in France remains a distant 
prospect.  
 
Thus the Fifth Republic is fascinating political phenomenon both because of the 
extraordinary circumstances in which it came into being, and also because of the 
complex combination of French political and constitutional traditions it contained, 
 20 
embodied, and sought anachronistically to reconcile. This volume explores how these 
aspects of French political culture have evolved under the 50 years of the French fifth 
Republic. The contributions to this special issue explore the dynamics of change and 
continuity in relation to these aspects of the French Republic tradition, and their 
expression in French political practice, over the last 50 years, culminating in 
assessment of their place within contemporary French politics and political 
institutions. 
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